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Post-Litigation Resulting From
Alleged Non.-Compliance With
Government Antitrust Consent
Decrees*
By John A. Duncan
S INCE THE Sherman Act1 was enacted in 1890, over 400 consent decrees
have been entered into with the federal government.2 In fact, from 1935
to March 31, 1955, 72% of -the civil anti-trust actions were terminated by
consent decrees 3 It therefore follows that most of those who have been
named defendants in such antitrust litigation have taken what appears to
them to be the "easy way out," little realizing at the time they made their
"settlement" with the Anti-
trust Division of the De-
THE AUTHoR (B.S., 1925, Princeton, UL.B.. partment of Justice that the
1929, Western Reserve) is a member of the whole thing might come
law firm of M. B. & H. H. Johnson in Cleve-
land, Ohio. back to "haunt" them some
day. In this regard, an em-
nent writer has cautioned:
A company subject to such orders [consent decrees], moreover, must
live with them from generation to generation, the sins of the fathers de-
scending from decade to decade unto their guiltless corporate successors.'
If the charge made by the Government is criminal, one can readily
understand why a party indicted of violating the antitrust laws wants to
* This article does not deal with the question of the public enforcement by the Fed-
eral Trade Commission of its cease and desist orders (over 4,000), stipulations of
cease and desist (about 8,000Y and trade practice rules (about 2,000); nor does it
deal with the question of private enforcement of consent decrees.
126 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §5 1-3 (1952).
2 REPORT or TH ATroRNEiY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITEBE TO STUDY ANTI-
TRUST LAWS 366 (March 31, 1955). "Presently (March 31, 1955) the Depart-
ment is responsible for enforcement of some 378 judgments entered since 1890."
However, according to 2 CCH TRAE REG. REP. 3 8421 (1955), the list of consent
decrees since the entry of the first such decree in 1906 to March 19, 1956 totals 406.
11d. at 360.
'VanCise, Laying the Foundation, How to Comply with the Ant-Trust Laws, CCH
ANTITRUST LAw SYmposuM 14 (1954), commenting on United States v. Swift &
Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932)
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dispose of the matter by pleading nolo contendere.5 But consent decrees
are only the outgrowth of civil actions leveled against an alleged anti-
trust violator, and it is therefore difficult to surmise why such litigants
should so readily "negoate" in a civil anttrust action and thereafter, by
agreement, permit themselves to be enjoined perpetually by a "continu-
ing decree of injunction directed to events to come."6 The usual answer
is that such a disposition avoids expense, thereby stopping the meter of
the lawyers from running any further. To this end their action is to be
commended both by the Board of Directors and the stockholders, unless
the parties who have so pleaded are unfortunate enough to be later
charged with having failed to comply with the terms of the consent de-
crees. In that event the meter will again run into unknown dollars, and
it is that kind of a post consent decree action with which this article in-
tends to deal.
It has been said that an important arm in enforcing the anti-trust
laws is the consent decree.7 With that there is no dispute. Since 1906,
when the first consent decree was entered," until the present tine, the
Department of Justice has relied upon that type of enforcement in civil
antitrust actions instituted by the Government. Inasmuch as the regu-
"'The institution of criminal proceedings, however, has graver implications than the
mere danger of financial penalty. It may mean indictment, surrender to the custody
of the U.S. Marshal, fingerprinting, posting of bonds, unfavorable publicity and,
above all, the very real threat of a jail sentence." Jerrold G. VanCise, Laying the
Foundation, How to Comply with the Anti-Trust Laws, CCH ANTITRUST LAW
SyMI'osiuM 14-16 (1954). In a recent proceeding in the United States District
Court for the District of Nevada, the court not only imposed fines but also sentenced
three of the individuals to terms of six months "in the custody of the Attorney Gen-
eral." Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n. v. United States, CCH TRADE REG. REP.
(1954 Trade Cas.) 5 67, 673 (9th Cir. 1954)
A Senate Bill introduced in 1956 provides for the imposition of civil penalties
on corporation officials who are responsible for criminal antitrust violations. Under
the bill, corporation officials who authorize acts which constitute a criminal violation
of the antitrust laws would be liable to forfeit to the United States an amount equal
to twice their compensation covering the period during which the violation occurred.
The bill also provides that such officials may be enjoined from rendering any services
to their company, permanently or for a specified period of not less than 90 days and
from receiving compensation during that period. If passed, it will prompt a busi-
nessman charged criminally with antitrust violations to "run to cover" and plead
nolo contendere almost the very day the indictment is returned. See S. 3516 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1956)
'As in United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932)
TIsenbergh and Rubin, Antitrust Enforcement Through Consent Decrees, 53 HARv.
L. REV. 386 .(1940)
'United States v. Otis Elevator Co., 1 DECREES AND JUDGMENTS IN FEDERAL
ANTITRUST CASES 106 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1906) See also CCH ANrTRUST BLUE-
BOOK 73 (1949 ed.).
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lanty of consent decrees has been on the increase in recent years,9 it ap-
pears that a study of what sometimes happens where subsequent non-
compliance with an existing consent decree is charged by the Government,
should serve as being timely as well as interesting.
MODIFICATION OF CONSENT DECREES
The earliest case found where the Government applied for further
relief after a consent decree was entered is United States v. International
Harvester Company.'0 It established the proposition that where the Gov-
ernment files a supplemental petition and endeavors to show (inasmuch
as it seeks the modification and thus has the burden of "convincing"
proof") that there has been disobedience on the part of those who have
consented to the decree, if there has been substantial compliance with the
terms of the decree, the action by the Government must be dismissed. In
the Harvester case, the original decree' 2 which was entered in 1914
ordered the dissolution of International Harvester into three parts. On
motion of the defendants, however, this order was modified and, on No-
vember 2, 1918, while the case was pending before the Supreme Court, a
consent decree was entered which reinstated the earlier decree obtained
by the Government, providing at the outset that the objective to be at-
mined under the terms of the decree was
to restore competitive conditions in the United States in the interstate
business in harvesting machines and other agricultural implements, and, in
the event that such competitive conditions shall not have been established
at the expiration of eighteen months after the termination of the existing
warranty * * * then, and in that case, the United States shall have the right
to suggest further relief herein as shall be necessary to restore such com-
petitve conditions and to bring about a situation in harmony with the
law. 23
Five years after this antitrust consent decree was entered, a supplemental
petition was filed by the Government which alleged that competitive con-
ditions as they had existed some nineteen years before, when the company
had acquired its five competitors, had not been restored, and that unless
International Harvester was broken up, it would continue its monopolistic
control Three years later, the supplemental petition was disposed of by
' Donovan and McAllister, Consent Decrees in the Enforcement of Federal Antitrust
Laws, 46 HAlv. L REV. 885 (1933) "Since (1917), with a few breaks, their (con-
sent decrees) regularity has been increasing."
"0274 U.S. 693 (1927).
'Oriel v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358 (1929); Kansas City Power v. N.L.R.B., 137 F.2d
77 (8th Cir. 1943); United States v. Univis Laws Co., 88 F. Supp. 809 (S.D.N.Y.
1950); United States v. Discher, 255 Fed. 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1919)
"United States v. International Harvester Co., 214 Fed. 987 (D. Minn. 1914).
2United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 697 (1927).
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the trial court,14 which found that the Government (which sought the
modification and therefore had the burden of proof) had failed to es-
tablish non-compliance by clear and convincing evidence. This finding
was affirmed by the Supreme Court.'5
Thus, the Government lost in its attempt to restore the competitive
conditions that had existed sixteen years before when the consent decree
had been entered.
In 1932, however, the Supreme Court decided the case of United States
v. Swift & Co.,16 and announced in effect that the court which entered the
consent decree has the power to modify the decree, if such becomes neces-
sary by reason of changed conditions. But said the Court, "Nothing less
than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen con-
ditions should lead us to change what was decreed after years of litigation
with the consent of all concerned."' 7 So one can readily conclude that when
the Government tries to modify the terms of a consent decree, it is indeed
an uphill fight.'8 By the same token, it is equally as hard for a former
alleged violator to obtain relief by filing an application to modify a con-
sent decree so as to throw off what might in some cases be tantamount
to a straight jacket.' 9 And this appears to be so, even though the court
retains jurisdiction by reason of a provision in the consent decree that the
jurisdiction of the court is retained so as to enable any of the parties to
the decree to apply to the court at any time for such further orders and
directions as may be necessary or appropriate for the modification there-
of.20 In the case of United States v. Radio Corp. of A-merfca,2 ' the Gov-
ernment filed a motion in 1954 to construe and enforce a consent decree
entered eighteen years before. But the District Court denied it because
the language in the decree was deemed clear and unambiguous.
The doctrine announced by the Supreme Court in the Swift case was
"not to reverse [consent decrees] under the guise of readjusting."22 How-
ever, when the Supreme Court passed upon the case of United States v.
Chrysler Corp3  in 1942, it departed somewhat from this caveat and
found that the extension of the bar against affiliation did not amount to
an abuse of the District Court's power to modify the consent decree in
"United States v. International Harvester Co., 10 F.2d 827 (D. Minn. 1926).
"See note 10 supra.
1 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
"
T Id. at 119.
'United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 46 F. Supp. 654 (D. Del. 1942)
"See note 16 supra.
United States v. Bausch & Lamb Optical Co., 97 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Ill. 1951)
nCCH TRADi REG. REP. (1954 Trade Cas.) 5 67,704 (D. Del. 1954).
'United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932)
"316 U.S. 556 (1942)
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the absence of a showing by Chrysler that the extension placed it at a
competitive disadvantage, inasmuch as such opportunity was specifically
granted by the trial court in extending the date of the contingency pro-
vision.
Six years later in United States v. Ford Motor Co.,24 the Supreme
Court granted relief to Ford by suspending from the consent decree the
prohibition which banned affiliation between Ford and a finance com-
pany. The Supreme Court found that the prohibited acts had not yet
been enjoined as to the competitor and that there had been no adjudica-
tion of the acts being illegal and further found that the prohibitions had
expired by the very terms of the consent decree.
In brief, the doctrine announced in the Swift case dealing with modi-
fication of consent decrees appears to have been somewhat relaxed. But
whether the Government or those defendants who consented to enter into
the decree later move to modify the decree so as to conform to present
conditions, the probabilities are that such a motion will eventually be de-
rued, unless it is shown that the modification is a necessary adaptation to
changed conditions. Courts have been somewhat reluctant to allow modi-
fication although there have been some Government antitrust consent de-
crees, in addition to the Ford case, which have been modified25 Recent-
ly the Department of Justice has "persuaded" some defendants to agree
in the decree to permit the Government to apply within two or three
years for other or further relief with regard to the activities of any of the
defendants relating to credit, and furthermore to agree that such relief
might be granted upon proper showing but without the necessity of a
showing by the Government of any change of circumstances since the
entry of the decree.26
Usually the party seeking the modification has the burden of proof
and must show that conditions have changed,2 7 but a U. S. district court
sitting in Florida recently held that the Government could petition the
-335 U.S. 303 (1948).
'See Allen Calculators, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137 (1944);
United States v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1952 Trade
cas.) 5 67,237 (W.D.N.Y. 1952); United States v. American Bosch Corp., CCH
TRADE REG. REP. (1948 Trade Cas.) 62,284 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); United States v.
Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1943 Trade Cas.) 5 56,-
268 (D. Del. 1943); United States v. Standard Oil Co. (N.J.), CCH TRADE REG.
REP. (1943 Trade Cas.) 5 56,269 (D. N.J. 1943); United States v. Radio Corp.
of America, 3 F. Supp. 23 (D. Del. 1935).
United States v. Allied Florists Ass'n., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1953 Trade Cas.)
5 67,433 (N.D. IIl. 1953).
'See note 10 supra.
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court for further relief wthout the necessity of showing any change in
circumstances.28 Obviously this does not represent the general rule.
ENFORCEMENT OF GovERNMENT CONSENT DEC1ZEES
It has become apparent, over the years, that immediate settlement of
injunction suits brought by the Government under the Sherman Act has
been regarded by most businessmen and some lawyers as a quick way of
cheaply disposing of antitrust litigation.29
But inasmuch as consent decrees are subject to being opened up"0 by
supplemental proceedings instituted by the Government when its enforce-
ment division believes, or has reason to believe, that the defendants have
failed to comply with the terms set forth in the decree, it behooves the
parties named as defendants originafly in an antitrust case to realize what
post-littgation might be in store for them. And this is even true where
permissible activity enumerated in the consent decree comes under the
scrutiny of the enforcement division. For it must be remembered
that the declaratory provisions do not constitute a judical guarantee that
the described acts are legal. They merely announce that those acts are not
prohibited by this (particular) injunction and this announcement would
seem to be no legal barrier to the Department's obtaining another injunc-
tion against just those acts if it could prove that they violated the antitrust
laws. =
And neither advice of counsel nor good intentions are valid defenses since
the purpose of a civil contempt proceeding is remedial 3 2 However, they
may be considered by the court in mitigation of failure to comply.33
Because of the vagueness of the Sherman Act, the Consent Decree
Section of the Department of Justice appears to have broad discretion as
to what the decree will contain "since almost any phase of economic regu-
'United States v. Minute Maid Corp., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1955 Trade Cas.) 5
68,131 (D. Fla. 1955)
'Duncan, John A., The "Big Case" - When Tried Criminally, 4 WaT. RES. L
REv. 99, 108 (1953).
'62 STAT. 701 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1952) "A court of the United States
shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment at its discretion, such contempt
of it authority, and none other, as:
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or
command." (Emphasis added)
Punishment may be by imprisonment in excesss of six months for commission of
acts constituting criminal contempt of a decree enjoining a violation of the antitrust
laws, rendered in a suit brought by the United States. Hill v. United States ex rel.
Weiner, 300 U.S. 105 (1937), reversing, 84 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1936).
Isenbergh and Ruben, Antitrust Enforcement Through Consent Decrees, 53 HARV.
L REv. 386, 394 (1940).
'Bigelow v. R.K.O., 78 F. Supp. 250, 258 (N.D. Ill. 1948).
al re Chilcote Co., 9 F.R.D. 571, 573 (N.D. Ohio 1949) But advice of counsel
and reliance thereon is a good defense in a crsminal contempt proceeding.
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lation could conceivably and perhaps plausibly be related to the enforce-
ment of the Sherman Act.:" 4 At best, a consent decree is not a litigation
decree but merely the product of bargaining between the Government
and the defendants [the latter having a marginal incentive to avoid three
things: (1) the onerous expense and adverse publicity; (2) possible
treble damage suits; and (3) the obvious desirability to avoid a criminal
conviction].
Assume that a client has taken the "easy way oue' by entering into a
consent decree, and assume further that the Department, either upon com-
plant or otherwise, notifies the client that it is making an investigation
in order to determine whether the client has complied with the terms of
the consent decree involved. There would be a threshold question as to the
extent of the investigative powers of the Government in such a situation.
Except for special provisions in a consent decree relative to (a) re-
tention of jurisdiction, (b) examination of records of the defendants by
Government representatives to determine whether or not there has been
compliance, and/or (c) self-policing and dissoluton, -antitrust consent
decrees entered into with the Government are enforceable in the same
way as contested decrees.
However, most of the consent decrees drafted in recent years have
provided for their own enforcement. Usually at the end of the decree
there is a paragraph with respect to retention of jurisdiction by the
court,35 and it is interesting to note that the courts have declared that the
mere passage of time will not deprive them of jurisdiction over the sub-
ject matter of their original decree38
" Isenbergh and Ruben, supra note 31, at 405.
' An an example of this kind of government reservation, see the following provision
inserted in the consent decree entered in United States v. Automatic Sprinkler Co.,
CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1948 Trade Cas.) i 62,230 (N.D. Ill. 1948)
"For the purpose of securing compliance with this judgment and for no other
purpose, duly authorized representatives of the Department of Justice shall, upon
written request of the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General, and on
reasonable notice to any defendant, be permitted, subject to any legally recognized
privilege, (a) access during the office hours of such defendant to all books, ledgers,
accounts, correspondence, memoranda, and other records and documents in the pos-
session or under the control of such defendant relating to any of the matters con-
tined in this judgment, and (b) subject to the reasonable convenience of such
defendant and without restraint or interference from it, to interview officers or em-
ployees of such defendant, who may have counsel present, regarding any such matters;
provided, however, that no information obtained by the means permitted in this
paragraph shall be divulged by any representative of the Department of Justice to
any person other than a duly authorized representative of the Department of Justice,
except in the course of legal proceedings to which the United States is a party for
the purpose of securing compliance with this judgment or as otherwise required by
law."
"Umted States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1954 Trade
Cas.) 5 67,828 (D. R.I. 1954).
1956"1
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Consent decrees also contain ordinarily a provision permitting reason-
able access by Government agents to books, ledgers, accounts, correspond-
ence, memoranda and other data in the defendants' possession or under
their control which in any way relate to the matters set up in the consent
decree. In addition, they usually have an express provision permitting
Government enforcement representatives to interview officers and em-
ployees for the purpose of determining whether there has been a com-
pliance with the terms of the consent decree. To facilitate this determina-
tion the Government has required records to be maintained intact and open
for inspection for as long as ten years.
Another typical provision contained in a great many consent decrees
requires a defendant association or union to inform their members of the
contents of the decree and if members violate the terms, the association
or union is charged with the duty of disciplining them so as to secure
compliance a
This method of self-policing imposed by the Antitrust Division appears
to be within statutory and constitutional bounds. Such is especially so
since the Division is not a mere private litigant. But in enforcing a fed-
eral statute, the antitrust officials are inclined to the view that they should
demand whatever relief their bargaining position may coerce, and some-
times insist upon inserting a provision in the consent decree which re-
quires dissolution after a certain fixed period.,as
The self-policing provision has been extended to a situation in which
a defendant newspaper was required to insert in its publication a notice
which fully apprised its readers of the substantive terms of the consent
decreea 9
In the main, whatever data is requested which in any way pertains to
the terms set forth in the decree would appear to be subject to Govern-
ment reach. In all probability, this will put a client to some hardship,
but no matter how great that will be, the Government enforcing agents
can pursue their investigation to the point where, armed with sufficient
data, litigation dealing with the question as to whether there has been a
compliance since the decree was entered, may and usually does follow.
Non-compliance with an antitrust consent decree is punishable by the
'eUnited States v. Tile Contractors' Ass'n., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1940 Trade
Cas.) 5 56,044 (D. Ill. 1940); United States v. Long Island Sand & Gravel Pro-
ducers Ass'n., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1940 Trade Cas.) 5 56,048 (D. N.Y. 1940).
'United States v. Minute Maid Corp., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1955 Trade Cas.)
5 68,131 (D. Fla. 1955); see also, United States v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 121 F.
Supp. 141 (E.D.N.Y. 1954), order modified on rehearing, 123 F. Supp. 653
(E.D.N.Y. 1954).
' United States v. Mansfield Journal Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1952 Trade Cas.)
5 67,210 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
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federal court either as civil or criminal contempt. This may take the
form of a supplemental petition and be filed on the civil side of the court
seeking a modification of the antitrust consent decree. This may also
take the form of either a civil or criminal contempt action, or both. In
a crtmina contempt proceeding, the burden is upon the Government to
prove its charges beyond all reasonable doubt.40 In Bridges v. Cali-
fornia,4x Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated in a dissenting opimon that "the
power to pumsh for contempt should be used only in flagrant cases and
with the utmost forbearance," inasmuch as it "is always better to err on
the side of tolerance and even of disdainful indifference." However that
may be, a federal court has the power to punish, by fine or imprisonment,
for contempt of its authority where disobedience of its decree has been
shown.2
' It is interesting to note that in such proceedings, the court's summary powers have
been curtailed to the extent that the accused (1) must be presumed to be innocent:
People v. Spain, 307 111. 283, 138 N.E. 614 (1923); (2) need not testify against
himself: Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911); Root v. Mac-
Donald, 260 Mass. 344, 157 N.E. 684 (1927); and (3) must be found guilty be-
yond a reasonable doubt: It; re McIntosh, 73 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1934); Sabin v.
Fogarty, 70 Fed. 482 (CC.E.D. Wash. 1895)
An accused is entitled to (1) be advised of the charges against him, and (2)
have a reasonable opportunity to meet them by way of defense or explanation. In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266 (1948). According to In the matter of Patterson, 125
F. Supp. 881, 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) "A mere categorical denial of knowledge of
the whereabouts or existence of the records is certainly not condusive, and may be
insufficient to overcome the prima facie case, particularly where his credibility is
impaired by prior contradictory statements. As the Supreme Court has pointed out,
it is not incumbent on the prosecution to negative every possible excuse for non-
action upon its mere assertion by the witness." (Emphasis supplied) See also: United
States v. Hall, 198 F.2d 726, 729 (2d Cir. 1952); Clark v. United States, 61 F.2d
695, 700 (8th Cir. 1932); United States v. Dachis, 36 P.2d 601, 603 (S.D.N.1.
1929).
However, in contempt proceedings for its enforcement, a decree will not be ex-
panded by implication or intendment beyond the meaning of its terms when read in
the light of the issues and the purpose for which the suit was brought. The facts
found must show a PLAIN violation of the decree so read. Terminal R.R. Ass'n. v.
United States, 266 U.S. 17, 29 (1924); United States v. Atchison Ry. Co., 142 Fed.
176 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1905); In re Cary, 10 Fed. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1882); Deming
v. Bradstreet, 85 Conn. 650, 84 At. 116 (1912); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v.
Miller, 112 Ky. 464, 66 S.W 5 (1902); Porous Plaster Co. v. Seabury, 1 N.Y.
Supp. 134 (1888); Weston v. Lumber Co., 158 N.C. 270.73 S.E. 799 (1912);
Sullivan v. J. & L Steel Co., 222 Pa. 72, 70 At. 775 (1908); Ophir Creek Water
Co. v. Opir Hill Mining Co., 61 Utah 551, 216 Pac. 490 (1923); Wisconsin Cen-
tral Ry. Co. v. Smith, 52 Wis. 140, 8 N.W 613 (1881).
41314 U.S. 252, 304 (1941) (dissent); see also, United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S.
563 (1906).
"Punishment may be by imprisonment in excess of 6 months for commission of
acts constituting criminal contempt of a decree enjoining a violation of the antitrust
laws, rendered in a suit brought by the United States. Hill v. United States ex rel.
Weiner, 300 U.S. 105 (1937), reversing, 84 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1936).
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There is ample authority empowering United States District Courts
to punish as criminal contempt violations of its order even though the
basic action has become moot.43
In United States v. Gamewell Company," the Government instituted
both criminal and civil contempt proceedings which grew out of an al-
leged violation of a consent judgment (where fines aggregated $43,250).4s
In those proceedings the Government was successful in its efforts to have
the defendants found guilty of contempt of court, boih civil and criminal.
In the Gamewell case, the charge of non-compliance related to a consent
decree which had been entered some four years before the enforcement
contempt actions began. The Government contended that since the de-
fendants had disobeyed certain parts of the decree, and had become
"cozy," so to speak, with municipal officials by giving them free engi-
neering services, the district court should enter an order requiring them
(1) to remedy their course of conduct so as to conform to the decree
and (2) to punish for past violations. The defendants were enjoined
under the consent decree from giving engineering services free of charge
where they were the highest bidders. In certain specific instances, they
were shown not to have billed for the cost of engineering services where
they were the successful bidders and the Court so found.
A more recent set of cases involving alleged disobedience of a final
judgment entered in a Government antitrust case is United States v. J.
Myer Schine,46 which also involved a dual proceeding (civil and crimi-
nal) before a District Court sitting in the Western Division of New York
The defendants who were charged with non-compliance filed motions
both in the civil contempt action and in the criminal contempt action,
asking that such actions be dismissed. The trial court denied both mo-
tions. Neither the Gamewell nor the Schine cases were appealed, and
there appear to be no authorities reversing them. Therefore, they stand
as favorable authorities in behalf of the Government.
CONCLUSION
Enforcement actions should be limited to situations where substantial
"Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 335 U.S. 303, 322 (1948); United States v.
United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 293 (1947); Chrysler Corp. v. United States,
316 U.S. 556, 562 (1942); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932);
Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911); Worden v. Searls, 121
U.S. 14 (1887); Bigelow v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 170 F.2d 783, 786 (7th Cir.
"1948). See also REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL's NATIONAL COMNIr rE TO
STUDY ANTITRUST LAws 366, 367 (March 31, 1955)
"95 F. Supp. 9 (D. Mass. 1951).
"CCH TRADE REG. REP. Supp. 9 62,771 (1950)
"125 F. Supp. 738 (W.D.N.Y. 1954) (civil); 125 F. Supp. 734 (W.D.N.Y.
1954) and 126 F. Supp. 464 (W.D.N.Y. 1954) (criminal)
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complaints have been received. The mere receipt of a few complaints
should not alone determine whether there has been disobedience on the
part of an alleged offender. If the department were to conduct an investi-
gation at random (and it has carried on compliance campaigns from time
to time in the past4 7), the financial burden would be exorbitant and the
result might be of little consequence. Perhaps the answer to the situa-
tion lies m that part of the report of the Attorney General's National
Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws,48 wherein it recommended that
the department conduct regular studies to determine whether its antitrust
decrees or judgments had been effective to restore competition, utilizing
Section 6(c) of the Federal Trade Commission Act authorizing the Com-
mission "upon the application of the Attorney General" to "make investi-
gation' and report to the Attorney General on how any .antitrust de-
cree "has been or is being carried out." This may solve a very per-
plexing and sometimes a most confusing problem so far as the Govern-
ment is concerne. 49
But looking at it from the standpoint of those defendants who are to
"In January, 1941, a special unit was established to handle matters in connection
with the operation of the motion picture consent decrees entered in these cases:
United States v. Paramount Pictures, 1 F.R.D. 100 (D.C.N.Y. 1940); United Stares
v. Balaban, 26 F. Supp. 491 (N.D. Ill. 1939). See CCH TRADE REG. REP. 5
8401.35, 8401.38 for the Department of Justice release of January 16, 1941, de-
scribing the scope of that unit's activity, and Preliminary Report (ending November
20, 1943) of the special unit established to supervise the operation of the motion
picture decrees.
" See note 2 supra.
"It is interesting to note that doubt as to whether adequate relief has been afforded
in important antitrust cases through reliance upon consent decrees rather than court
adjudication, has recently been expressed by the Staff Members of the Subcommittee
on Antitrust and Monopoly. Senate Report No. 1879, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 119
(1956). The following conclusion resulted from a study of "Bigness and Concen-
tration of Economic Power -A Case Study of General Motors Corp."
"The long struggle of dealers to force abandonment of coercive and oppressive
practices by which they were compelled to purchase parts and accessories exclusively
from General Motors culminated in the issuance of a cease and desist order agaitst
General Motors by the Federal Trade Commission more than 14 years ago. Yet,
because of innumerable complaints of violations, this order is still under investiga-
uon in order to determine the extent to which General Motors is complying there-
with."
By way of explanation for having resorted to such a case study, it is stated in the
introduction of the study- "On the subjject of bigness and concentration, the Report
of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws is largly
silent. It inadequately treats the problem of oligopoly, confining itself for the
most part to a consideration of existing law dealing with conduct which results m
restraint of trade or monopolization. The Attorney General's committee stated that
there was a need for factual studies by which the report's specific recomendatons
could be tested. However, it did not feel that it was equipped, or that it was its
function, to make the type of factual findings that would be required. "
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be examined and cited and who are under a duty to defend their actions
since the consent decree went into effect (whnch might be a period of
many years), perhaps the best recourse for them is not to rush in "where
angels fear to tread." So many of them, when first charged with antitrust
violation, capitulate and "sign up" a consent decree which may eventually
serve to haunt them the rest of their corporate days.
